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Abstract: The psychology of argumentation (PSA), a relatively new field of study, has added new 
insight into argumentation theory and informal logic, fields that so far have been strongly influenced 
by the philosophy of argumentation (PHA). One assumption with regard to PSA is that reasoning is 
argumentative and constructed to persuade. Thus, the successful outcome of reasoning is the ability to 
persuade for action to adapt to specific situations. Whereas biased beliefs – generated by mechanisms 
such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning – might sway production and evaluation of 
arguments significantly, PSA claims to offer an encompassing perspective on reasoning as it is. Arguers 
do not primarily activate reasoning for logical purposes; they do so rather to justify particular beliefs 
as well as actions. This approach seems encouraging in a context of genuine debate when the effects of 
biased beliefs can be nullified in the process of argument evaluation, which depends on context. In 
contrast, from a critical PHA-perspective, reasoning is analyzed and corrected as fallacious and 
slippery communication in line with a normatively demanding perspective of PHA. Insight from the 
PHA on smooth, manipulative, and outsmarting dialogue shifts might be decisive for understanding the 
outcome of a debate or group work, and it thus gives a necessary additional perspective. Another way 
in which the PSA and the PHA can complement each other concerns the fact that the PSA gathers data 
in the lab (cf. in vitro/”in glass”, referring to a lab) while the PHA does so outside the lab (cf. in 
vivo).  In this paper I will imply how knowledge from the PSA and the PHA might be complementary as 
to a fruitful division of labor between the PHA and the PSA. Through critical thinking the PHA might 
increase awareness of dialogue shifts and eristic debates based on field studies, whilst the PSA can 
provide a perspective for unbiased argument evaluation and ideal debates in vitro. 
 
Keywords: informal logic, in situ, biased beliefs, confirmation bias, the psychology of 
argumentation, the philosophy of argumentation, reasoning, argument-evaluation, critical 
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1. Introduction  
Since the PSA is a new field of study, it is not unexpected that Argumentation – as a PHA-
oriented journal – has little coverage of the PSA. Yet, a reader might find versions of the 
argumentative function of reasoning (cf. e.g. Mercier.2011, 2012 and Trouche, Shao and 
Mercier.2019) 1 , whereas seemingly nothing as to a completary and crossdisciplinary 
perspective on the PHA and the PSA.   
Below I will regard the oportunities for a broader perspective. One problem might be 
little common ground as result of spezialization and differentiation as to the PHA and the PSA. 
Further, another challenge is that my presentation of a crossdisciplinary perspective on 
argument evaluation might be more general than readers are used to while of potential interest 
for futher research. Finally, my attempt for handling a broader perspective is a reason for not 
 
1  It is interesting that Mercier’s PSA argumentation seems varying from prudent and agreeable in a PHA journal as 
Argumentation, to antagonistic in e.g. Educational Psychologist.2017. In thr latter journal he claims that teaching fallacies is 




explicitely including argument production in addition to argument evaluation. So far both the 
PSA and the PHA have generated interest in argument evaluation and that sounds reasonable 
if the topic is sine qua non for e.g. creating and retaining democracy (cf. Schiappa.1995)2.  
Argument evaluation is in my paper contextualized by “informal logic”, a term that  
encompasses the PHA and maybe the PSA, whereas the latter on the one hand seems to distance 
itself from formal logic without defining “informal logic” (Mercier & Sperber.2011 b, p. 100)3, 
while on the other hand so far seems having little interest in clarifying itself as to a traditional 
logical view (cf. “argument” as “set of premises and conclusion” (Mercier.2012, p.306).  
Although Artificial Intelligence (AI) seems to be of growing interest in the PSA, and 
AI over time has been of increasing interest in the PHA for modelling of informal logic 
simulated on computers to develop theories of argumentation – I will refrain from adding the 
field of AI to my multidisciplinary approach. I find myself overloaded in combining the broad 
fields of the PHA and the PSA. Indeed, the picture I depict is not a complete one, neither of the 
PSA nor the PHA; it is a selection based on the history of the PHA and a brief history of the 
PSA. The advantage is that this allows me to approach argument evaluation more 
comprehensively than by closing in on either the PHA or the PSA.  
With regard to the literature relevant for informal logic and the PHA, I will refer to 
articles in The Handbook of Argumentation Theory edited by F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, 
E. C.W. Krabbe, F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij and J.M.H. Wagemans (2014). 
Additionally, I will cite from classical works such as e.g. Fundamentals in Argumentation 
Theory (Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996), and “classical” contributors 
like E. Schiappa and D. Walton. As for the PSA I mainly build on the target article by H. 
Mercier & D. Sperber (M&S) published in a special issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
(BBS, 2011a.), including peer comments and authors’ responses (BBS, 2011b.) and later 
articles by Mercier. In the target article, the authors show how the PSA stays on its own and 
how it optimistically presents claims for improved performance on reasoning in groups and the 
evaporating influence of biased beliefs.  
As to the structure of the paper, in section 2, Argumentation Argumentation 
Argumentation I present the first part of the PHA and argument evaluation. In section 3 I 
introduce the PSA and argument evaluation with brief reference to argument production in 
groups. In order to not circumvent argumentation that uses a sophistical tactic, I will in section 
4 look into evaluation of fallacious arguments presented by Walton, 1992 – based on 
Whately,1836, and quoted by Hamblin,1970 – including types of dialogues and dialogue shifts. 
This allows me to spot arguments produced through charm and sophistical tactics based on the 
PHA. In section 5 I focus on the PHA, the PSA and fallacious arguments. Finally, in section 6 
I present conclusions and propose future research regarding argument evaluation. 
      
2. The PHA and argument evaluation   
 
2  Hitherto, both approaches have expressed little interest in argument production. Nevertheless, Mercier et al. – as 
representatives for the PSA – lately have argued that reasoning should aim at argument production. thinking of arguments for 
the other side to overcome the “myside” bias (Mercier et al.2017). This seems curious since the PSA currently – by connecting 
psychology and argumentation – presents a “solution” to the problem of confirmation bias by argument evaluation, while from 
this point on it avowedly occurs in the production of arguments only. When searching for more typical and complementary 
knowledge of the PHA and the PSA, argument evaluation is of basic interest in the literature.  
3 Yet, the PHA implies several stages of “informal logic”, from the late 70s – as a position different from formal logic –  to 
the 80s when the movement was affiliated with critical thinking which remains applicable today. In the middle of the 80s a 
pragma dialectical approach was influential. Finally, in the 90s and to the present “informal logic” moved towards a 




As an introduction to the PHA, I will start with a broader and fundamentally based picture. The 
PHA evolved within a context of formal logic and analytic philosophy and is naturally still 
influenced by its heritage. Like informal logic and critical thinking,4 The PHA seems to have 
a legitimizing connection to formal logic. When “logic” is defined as a qua philosophical study 
of the norms of reasoning, informal logic as branch of logic takes the argumentation of 
nontechnical everyday discourse as its focus (Eemeren et al. 1996, p. 164). An illustration of 
legacy is when the PHA in reasoning holds that even appeals to emotion have argumentative 
schemes and a logic (cf. argumentation schemes for precisely identifying types of arguments, 
Walton, p. 21). On the other hand, contributors to informal logic and critical thinking have 
pointed out that formal logic in terms of inductive or deductive reasoning does not provide 
sufficient footing for evaluating arguments in toto (Schiappa & Nordin, 2014, p. 16)5. The 
weakness of formal logic develops when e.g. two cases have the same form, and particular 
differences may be ignored as to evaluation of those cases (ibid. p. 132). The more 
argumentation is employed in line with formal logic, the less likely it is that arguments will be 
evaluated in situ. 
As early as 1950s,Toulmin denied the view that there are universal norms for evaluation 
of arguments and that norms are served by formal logic6. When delivering his PhD in ethics, 
he published an examination of the place of reason in ethics,1950. Already in that monograph, 
Toulmin argues that philosophers should stop analyzing ethical terms and rather examine the 
interplay between specific contexts and ethical judgment (Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 204).  He 
was a frontrunner, and his book The Uses of Argument (1958) was unfortunately given little 
attention. However, through the years, it has become a standard work within informal logic. 
Toulmin advocates a radical reorientation of logic. Included in his critique is the premise that 
the validity of an argument should not depend exclusively on its form (cf. mathematical, or 
geometrical models of validity, Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 206). One example of a classical 
syllogism is that all A’s are B’s, and all B’s are C’s, then all A’s are C’s. Toulmin believes that 
mathematical logic should merge with epistemology and in this way study structure and content 
of arguments related to the academic disciplines and sciences, revealing qualities and defects 
of various arguments within different fields. He was a pioneer in showing that arguments are 
less a priori and more in situ oriented. This implies that definitions are arguments. 
Schiappa presents critical thinking as to definitions and evaluates them as arguments in 
his book Defining Reality (2003). According to him, defining is a version of argument 
production.  A premise in his contribution is that definitions are human beliefs subject to 
revision, including definitions that are advanced by a legislator, a scientist, an attorney, a 
political activist, or a philosopher (ibid. p. xii-xiii). Schiappa wants to replace the question 
“What is X?” with questions like “How ought we use the word X given our needs and interest? 
What is the purpose of defining X in context C?” (ibid. p. 168).  In this way Schiappa underlines 
that argument evaluation is dependent on definitions, context, needs and interest. Thus, 
justification of an argument illustrates more in situ and less a priori. When people realize the 
argument that definitions are made and not found, then we have the responsibility of knowing 
that the process of definition simply and indefinitely is social (ibid. p. 180).  
 
4 In the 1980s the terms informal logic and critical thinking were noticed as coterminous movements. The Association for 
Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) was founded to promote research and teaching within informal logic and 
critical thinking.  
2 According to van Eemeren, C. Wellman in 1971 ethical reasoning (even though that type of reasoning is not focused on in 
my contribution, it is not excluded) is neither deductive nor inductive, but conductive. Thus, a conductive, or “plausible” 
argument is crucially dependent on relevance (Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 392). Hence, concluding with relevance is a result of 
critical thinking.  
6 Toulmin has a comprehensive scholarly background, both in formal and informal logic. He studied physics and mathematics 
at Cambridge, thereby achieving basic and professional insight into formal logic.   
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Walton (2001) takes this even further, according to Schiappa, when he argues that as 
long as definitions are lodged into place in government regulations and law, they serve 
particular interests and are even coercive (ibid. p. 169). Hence, attempts to define reality should 
be treated as an argument open to critical questioning and counter-definitions. Here “argument” 
has a double meaning – both claim qua product and qua process (Schiappa & Nordin, 2014, p. 
9). Moreover, the process of argumentation evaluation is essential if you want to know what 
works and not only consider what is right and are satisfied with what occurs (ibid. p. 151).  
Schiappa edited a book on argument evaluation in 1995 without getting that much 
attention (cf. Case Studies in Argument Evaluation). Numerous case studies for argument 
evaluation were presented, such as improving argumentative competence, teaching critical 
thinking, improving decision making, as well as means of testing argument theory (Schiappa, 
1995, p. ix). However, Schiappa acknowledged that argument evaluation is by far the least 
popular modus operandi of the publishing scholar7. Interest from teachers and scientific authors 
has, with few exceptions, been low.  
The subject of the edited work by Schiappa, seems – as the title and a captivating 
introduction indicate – to find considerable interest within informal logic and critical thinking. 
On the one hand, the cases presented are oriented towards the Cold War, the former actor and 
President Ronald Reagan, the Soviet Air Defense Forces’ destruction of Korean Air Lines 
Flight 007 over the Sakhalin Island,8 dissent in the Supreme Court concerning fetal versus 
women’s rights, and alternative evaluations of the Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography. A Reagan effect or Bush effect -- when a President leaves the Oval Office -- does 
not last long before sentiment from the period is diffused. People seem to forget about history 
and look forward to another president with a different vision (cf. President Trump will make 
America Great Again)9. Moreover, the audience is easily influenced by a president who can 
use all the means at his disposal for swaying opinion, knowing that fake news is more enticing 
than argument evaluation. The audience might easily be outsmarted by activating e.g. 
prejudices.  
By including the PSA in the next paragraph, one might expect more interest in 
psychologically relevant effects of communication. Certain preferred versions of in situ might, 
in accordance with the PSA, circumvent confirmation bias, such as in groups and debates in 
which people are searching for the truth. While my introduction to the PHA followed 
“emancipation” of formal logic, it is curious that the PSA has less interest in “hot cognition” 






   
 
7 Schiappa argued for keeping argument evaluation away from the term “rhetoric” to avoid altering critical expectations. He 
claimed that standards are lowered once a text is dubbed rhetoric. This is a subtle critique of “rhetoric” not new as a label that 
takes on the sinister complexion of “propaganda”, defined qua abuse of rhetoric. Several comprehensive attempts have been 
made to evaluate arguments as propaganda (cf. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, IPA).  
8 Cf. Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a Russian-made Buk missile, the Dutch Safety Board 
concluded in its final report on the crash in July 2014. It seems that people were tired of the dramatic incident that killed all 
298 people on board, and that Putin’s RT worked effectively while there still was some interest in how it happened. When 
producing arguments, interest for evaluation of the arguments fades due to time and refutation from the parties.  
9 In IPA’s propaganda studies between World War I and II researchers claimed that it is hard to learn from the past while 
people and messages change. When the former Russian Prime Minister Medvedev asked if we are back in a Cold War period, 
a collective denial from Western countries seems to dominate responses as if history does not repeat itself in some way. 
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3. PSA and argumentation evaluation   
While the PSA seems to have an unresolved relationship with formal logic, it is more dependent 
on disciplines such as social psychology and psychology10. Still, the PSA seems less a formal 
examination of terms and more a contextual orientation. In a dialogic context based on 
everyday logic, one starts from the conclusion and tries to find premises that will convince 
one’s interlocutor. It is within this context M&S place the function of reasoning as 
argumentative, to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade (Op. cit. p. 57, 73).  
Within the context of a debate one is presumed to start out from a conclusion and by 
that detecting the best suited premises to convince the other party (ibid. p. 73). The term “debate” 
nonetheless implies everything from cogitation and deliberation to disputation, polemic, 
agitation and propaganda. Some types of dialogue seem to serve «genuine debate» or «good 
debate» and some promote “heated debate”, such as eristic dialogue11 – verbally attacking the 
opponent and revealing a deeper basis of conflict and thus creating an impression of chaos in 
order to play on bigotry.   
Conditions for debate are crucial for argumentation and for group performance. If 
arguments are challenged in a “good debate”, the quality of the arguments is normally 
significantly improved. (M&S, p. 62-63). As regards evaluation we are recommended not to 
look for flaws in our own arguments, but rather to allow others to find them and then adjust 
our arguments (op. cit. p. 73). According to M&S, the rationale for a confirmation bias in the 
production of arguments to support a given claim does not extend to the evaluation of 
arguments by an audience, which aims at distinguishing good arguments from bad ones and 
thus genuine information from misinformation (M&S p. 64, 72).  
M&S appear to have an optimistic view on evaluation bias. When people are motivated 
they seem to use reasoning to evaluate arguments correctly (2011a p. 61). On the other hand, 
M&S claim that even if people are doing their best, they still fail. M&S find that it is interesting 
when people through reasoning try as best as they can to find the logically correct answer, and 
they still fail even when the computation demanded by that task is not hard. M&S think this 
shows that reasoning is not geared toward pure, logical tasks. (M&S, p. 99). Hence, the authors 
refer to results saying that logical performance generally is fairly poor, e.g. a modus tollens 
conclusion is difficult to draw under individual and formal conditions (if p then q, not q, 
therefore not p). The more logical tasks are formalized and individualized, the harder it seems 
to solve a problem satisfactorily. When other skills are studied in a lab – such as argumentation 
performance – they function satisfactorily, including their ability to attribute the burden of 
proof suitably. M&S further claim that people are good at evaluating arguments at the level of 
whole discussions (ibid. p. 62). This sounds favorable even if it requires certain conditions. 
When reasoning is used in a propitious context – implying arguments among people who 
disagree but have a common interest in the truth – the confirmation bias is not as active as to 
the evaluation of arguments, while still active in the production of arguments.  
M&S propose an optimistic theory of confirmation bias founded on three predictions. 
The first is that it only should occur in argumentative situations. Secondly, it should occur only 
in production of arguments. Finally, the bias is in favor of confirming one’s own claims which 
 
10  M&S are both philosophers and have the advantage of knowing PHA, simultaneously presenting multidisciplinary 
perspectives since one of the authors is professor of philosophy and cognitive science, and the other author is a postdoctoral 
fellow in a philosophy, political science and economics program. 
11 According to Walton, eristic dialogue is a special version of dialogue with three characteristics that link it closer to a 
monologue. Firstly, there is minimal interest in rules of critical discussion. All that matters is attack and defense. Secondly, 
there is no interest in achieving grasp or searching for the truth. Finally, there is no open mindedness on the part of any of 





are not balanced by a corresponding bias in favor of disconfirming counterarguments (ibid. p. 
64). The authors admit at the same time that in discussion, back-and-forth arguments, argument 
production and argument evaluation included, are mixed up and it is not manageable to keep 
them independent.  
When people are asked to check out reasoning, they have a tendency to produce 
arguments depending on the conclusion. Thus, they are supporting or rebutting the argument 
and thereby engaged in a biased search for arguments. Yet, when people are supporting, they 
need less time compared to rebutting, which needs justification and more time. By looking for 
arguments contrary to their own conclusions people may find many weaknesses, and might 
function as procedure for circumventing confirmation bias under certain conditions, such as in 
the evaluation of arguments where this social mechanism and bias seems inactive. 
This is after all supposed to contribute to efficient division of cognitive labor, and 
reasoning biases are to become a positive force (op. cit. p.65, 73). Nonetheless, this seems to 
deviate from what the PHA researchers working with informal logic regard as the forceful 
effects of emotional appeals characterized by eristic dialogue.  
M&S admit that argumentation might be abused when arguing above the head of the 
audience, or by appeals to emotion; in this way the communicator uses argumentation to serve 
self-interest rather than the interests of the audience (p. 96). They still think overly 
optimistically and maybe unrealistically that problems from abuse are not typical in an ordinary 
group with several members. Truth wins out as soon as one participant has understood a 
problem and is thereby able to convince the other about the solution (2011a, p. 62). M&S put 
focus on what they call genuine debates (p. 99), contrary to group polarization (p. 63). 
Political debates are not examples of genuine debates. M&S claim optimistically that if 
people are skilled at producing and evaluating arguments in argumentative settings, a “genuine 
debate” should be a good argumentative context for reasoning performance, in spite of 
groupthink, face saving, strategic positioning etc. M&S hence state that certain circumstances 
can influence results in a dispute (2011b p. 99). The authors do not mention emotional appeals 
and fallible arguments explicitly, and thus seem not to be interested in the major points of 
fallible arguments or the challenge of playing on emotions such as fear and anger.  
However, fear might turn a debate from constructive dialogue of argumentation to 
monologue of agitation. Yet, M&S seem to lack interest in sophistical tactics, e.g. employing 
emotional appeals and emotion in argumentation. They seem to have a PHA focus when saying 
that the problem with the lone philosopher is using reasoning to develop coherent systems with 
a foundation for intuition that is dubious, while they underline groups as the crucial place for 
scientific reasoning, contrary to popular presentations of the lone genius (M&S, p. 100).  
 
• Groups 
M&S mention groups 57 times in their target article, without specifying the type of groups. 
Groups in a PSA context as presented by M&S could be small groups, and they refer to 
Dubreuil, 2010 when undercoring the role of sociability by the cognitive capacities of humans, 
and “small-scale traditional societies” that might include crowds (M&S, p. 60). Debreuil claims 
that humans have attained specific abilities for cooperative feeding and breeding through brain 
evolution (cf. prefrontal cortex), and thus have greater inhibitory control to resist deflecting 
cooperative behavior. His point, though, is not limited to small groups. When in Authors’ 
Response M&S refer to Baumeister et al. it is groups that enable the resolution of differences 
and contrast tween groups does not seem of interest to M&S (M&S p. 97). In a target article in 
BBS, 2016, Baumeister et al. focus on huge groups qua crowds and depict a comprehensive 
picture of groups, better or worse than the sum of their members. A continuum goes back to 
Le Bon,1896, and the crowds are worse than individuals alone. The other extreme of a 
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continuum Baumeister et al. find represented by Adam Smith,1776, regarding how groups as 
a society produce more than collections of individuals ever could (Baumeister et al.2016, p. 1).  
Still, the PSA by M&S and other contributors does not focus on group-size, nor that 
groups always make better decisions, rather that reasoning should work in a context of 
cooperation as a version of “genuine debate” (M&S.99). This gives the impression of a need 
for future research on differences between groups. Yet, small groups are easier to organize in 
a lab under controlled conditions. Crowds are hard to control in a lab and in the field.  
According to the PSA, groups can facilitate learning and comprehension of a broad 
variety of problems as an outcome of critical thinking in groups (cf. plausible, or most plausible 
arguments); still, M&S do not seem engaged in emotional appeals nor in moral arguments.    
 
• Moral disengagement as persuasive and adaptive according to the PSA? 
If the function of reasoning is to serve persuasion rather than the truth, moral disengagement 
might be persuasive as an adaptive position. M&S admit that people are not that receptive to 
moral arguments, as they are easily influenced by emotional appeals (ibid. p. 101). People are 
actually not well served by reasoning as to epistemic outcome and violation of moral intuition 
according to M&S. This reasoning is often applied to establish justifications for behavior that 
is seen as unfair. Experiments on choosing a short and fun task or a long and hard task often 
lead to handing the last one over to another and giving the fun task to oneself (ibid. p. 68). With 
this we are closer to manipulation based on well-being. The PSA literature shows significant 
interest in that. 
This literature has nonetheless shown a great interest in people selecting the alternative 
in which they can furnish their inference with plausible justification to themselves as well as 
to others.  A reviewer is prone to look for weaknesses in a paper to legitimize its refusal when 
disagreeing with its conclusions (ibid. p. 66).  If people do not find necessary support for their 
position, they might change to a conclusion that is easier to defend. Homo sapiens look for 
arguments to defend a conclusion or position and by moral disengagement several social 
mechanisms are offered to facilitate arriving at any conclusion.  According to A. Bandura, 
people can do harm and live with themselves (Bandura, 2016). That implies several social 
mechanisms for moral justification of immoral actions (cf. minimizing/ignoring/misconstruing 
the consequences, attribution of blame, palliative comparison including self-exonerating 
purposes by slippery utilitarian standards, dehumanization and euphemistic labeling) having 
relevance for reasoning when producing and evaluating arguments.  
Yet, human beings will engage more genuinely in reasoning when knowing that their 
arguments will be evaluated in public (cf. principle of publicity). In addition, if people are 
representing others, they are less inclined to succumb to effects that lead them astray and less 
prone to employing slippery utilitarian principles (M&S, 2011a, p. 71). M&S hold that when 
choosing and representing other people we are better at identifying failings. M&S suggest 
letting other persons find flaws in your own argumentation.  
In political debates, the essential question is what works. People are not like messengers 
or listeners who are interested in finding out if arguments are strong or weak - the point is the 
applause that comes out of argumentation, rather than the plausibility of arguments. In his 
speeches before the Congress, President G.W. Bush (GWB) is an illustration of neither being 
better at identifying failings nor letting other people find bugs. He had advisers and 
speechwriters to correct flaws. Nevertheless, axis of evil and other constructions like weapons 
of mass destruction were framed by those expected to redress boogeymen, instead of 
constructing bugbears. 
In a peer comment from Sternberg (2011, p. 88-89), Donald Rumsfeld is used as an 
example of someone who reasons poorly and still is able to persuade by false arguments.  
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Sternberg claims that arguments of unscrupulous clergymen are leading to terrorist attacks 
today. Mass-communication with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) during that 
time seems in line with eristic dialogue (Walton, 1992), or propaganda epitomized by what 
Pierre Proudhon wrote in a letter to Karl Marx in 1846: ‘Let us never consider a question as 
exhausted, and when we have used our last argument, let’s begin again, if need be, with 
eloquence and irony.” A yearlong agenda of toppling Saddam was helped out by 9/11 and in a 
rock-video at youtube.com, now removed, the clergymen around GWB and himself repeated 
WMD over and over again. GWB seemed to have resigned under pressure for adaption while 
arguing self-deceptively and self-persuasively with himself on WMD.  
Weber et al. (2011) focus on knowing what we want by arguing with ourselves. 
According to them, so called reasoning errors are not errors, rather they are examples of 
adaptive inferences in situ vis-à-vis the social world and our preferences, or preferences of 
others. Weber et al. pointed out that Benjamin Franklin was challenged by ambivalence 
between vegetarian beliefs and the smell of freshly caught fish on a sea voyage (2011, pp. 91-
92). The mindful claim “Find or make a reason for everything one has in mind to do” (ibid. p. 
91) appears remarkably interesting qua basic element to the function of reasoning, and in line 
with Trivers’1988 introduction to self-deception: “Our internal account of motivation is 
suspect; it may be produced for external consumption by others.” (1988, p. viii).  
In another critical remark to M&S the truth seems replaced by self-seeking behavior 
with guile and persuasion. Stupple and Ball (2011) comment that the M&S version “of 
reasoning, not as involving the noble pursuit of truth, but instead as a Machiavellian 
communicative art with persuasion and self-interest at its core” (2011, p. 89).  Skilled arguers 
are not after the truth; they are searching for arguments that defend an opinion.  This version 
of reasoning is not in accordance with the classical view, rather it bolsters “people’s opinions, 
distorts their estimates, and allows them to get away with violations of their own moral 
intuitions”, and behave unfairly. M&S admit that in several cases moral goals are not well 
served by reasoning. (M&S 2011a, p. 68).  
M&S seem to perceive moral disengagement as functional adaptations without 
awareness of contradicting their own image of people being after the truth. M&S might reply 
that there is a difference for level of analysis, and that the perspectives do not compete. Maybe 
differences are based on various versions of in situ. When people are organized in small groups 
primed for genuine debates while evaluating arguments in a lab they are after the truth. 
However, when people placed outside a lab are swayed by a skilled flimflammer playing on 
prejudices and mass communication, the mind seems reduced to a social instrument wherein 
critical thinking and evidence are circumvented.           
Figure 1 below is based on M&S and offers four positions (cf. ibid p. 72): 
 
Figure 1: 
   Win a debate      Being after the truth    
Produce arguments            1                           2 
Evaluate arguments           3                           4 
When people evaluate arguments, they are supposedly making a better performance than by 
producing arguments, and they are more capable when being after the truth than winning a 
debate. This implies that out of four alternatives, the most promising is within category 4, and 
the least promising represented by 1. M&S point out that in a debate people might lose interest 
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in evaluation and evidence; they are more interested in refuting their contestant. People do not 
have much time or interest in checking out flaws in their own arguments but are rather more 
motivated for identifying failings in their challenger’s argumentation. Based on the above 
arguments, evaluation seems better served by groups than individuals. When people are 
involved in argument-production, or evaluation, the tendency to use biased reasoning is less 
when searching for truth than when involved in a debate (ibid. p. 69).  
In summary, M&S acknowledge that people are supposed to have the capability of 
reasoning in an unbiased way, such as when evaluating arguments and when they are after the 
truth (2011a, p.72). However, the questionable and typical version of in situ outside a lab is:  
Debates are not genuine and debaters are not searching for the truth, and controversies often 
take place before an audience targeted in a sophistical tactic for manipulating the arguments by 
emotional appeals and biased beliefs in order to circumvent critical evaluation. For situations 
like this the PSA seems to lack interest and has little to offer, while the PHA-analysis of 
fallacious arguments and dialogue-shifts seems useful. In part 4, I will return to the PHA 
literature and elucidate evaluation of fallacious arguments based on a selection of Walton’s 
contributions. 
   
4. Evaluation of fallacious arguments 
 
The word fallacy is based on the Latin term fallacia that has several meanings, such as deceit, 
trickery, treachery, stratagem, artifice, craft or intrigue (Lewis, 1879), defined as incorrect 
arguments that appears to be correct (cf. Hamblin 1970). The PSA by M&S seems not to have 
interest in fallacious arguments, except for making a distinction between logical fallacies and 
fallacies of argumentation, and even the peer comments in the special issue of BBS do not raise 
questions about fallacies of argumentation. The PHA has a critical tradition of working with 
fallacies of argumentation, categorizing several types of fallible arguments. By types of 
dialogues and dialogue shifts I refer to Walton as well as different versions of fallible 
arguments. 
 
• Types of fallible arguments 
Walton’s fallacy theory includes tactics for blocking legitimate dialogue goals that make it hard 
to evaluate if appeal to emotion might be relevant, wherein an argument is logically weak and 
psychologically strong. A common feature of fallacious arguments is emotional appeal or the 
speaker’s ability to arouse and exploit the sentiments and prejudices of a target audience. The 
Latin term “ad” connected to terms that are explained below, means directed towards a frame 
of mind, emotions or the audience.  
The following four main ad-arguments become fallacious when premises are made 
psychologically relevant by arousing emotions, and the respondent may not know if the burden 
of proof is fulfilled by the premises to support the conclusion (D. N. Walton, 1992, pp. 1-4):  
• argumentum ad populum, an appeal to popular sentiment, often referred to as an “appeal 
to the gallery” or “mob appeal”, where ideas are presented in a strong, theatrical manner 
and target the most primitive instincts 
• argumentum ad hominem, use of personal attacks (a characteristic of propaganda) to 
effect character assassination; and argumentum ad auctoritate, proof derived from 
authority. 
• argumentum ad misericordiam, an appeal to pity to support its conclusion  
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• argumentum ad baculum  (“baculum” means ceptre and symbolized magisterial 
authority), an appeal to threats, fear and force implying legal compulsion12  
Fallacious arguments are identified by the buttressing of bias, the aggressive intensification of 
emotional appeals, the elimination of legitimate dialogue, and the entrapping of respondents 
in a deceptive judgment position. Yet, respondents may not know when communication 
includes premises that are psychologically relevant and not logically relevant, or to what extent 
premises twist or falsify the evidence. Appeals to emotion make more out of it than erroneous 
inferences by capitalizing on a bias that shifts or by shifting the context of a dialogue (Walton, 
1992, p. 264), or types of dialogue. Communication with a hidden agenda may also cover 
another function of an argument by concealing a transition from one dialogue to another.  
Tactical moves by the parties involved in a debate are decisive for how a debate 
develops and for how likely a dialogue shift might occur. Some types of dialogues seem to 
serve so-called genuine debates and some heated debates such as eristic dialogue. When in situ 
is not controlled in a lab and tactical moves including fancy footwork and cover (Walton, 1992, 
pp. 214-216) manipulate argumentation, it is a challenge to spot dialogues and dialogue shifts.  
 
• Types of Dialogue and Dialogue Shifts: 
In this section, I will bring up six types of dialogues, including additional points that might be 
clarifying, such as 1: Initial Situation, 2: Participant’s Goal, and 3: Goal of Dialogue (cf. 
Walton, 2007, p. 60 Table 2.1). 
• deliberation 1: dilemma, 2: coordinate goals and actions, 3: decide best 
course of action  
• persuasion (cf. the function of reasoning) 1: conflict of opinion, 2: persuade 
the other party, 3:  resolve or clarify issue 
• eristic 1: personal conflict, 2: verbally attack an opponent, 3: reveal deeper 
basis of conflict  
• inquiry 1: need to have proof, 2: find and verify evidence, 3: prove (disprove) 
evidence 
• information-seeking 1: need information, 2: acquire or give information, 
exchange information   
• negotiation 1: conflict of interests, 2: get what you most want, 3: reasonable 
settlement that both can live with 
An example of dialogue shift that easily might occur is e.g. where to go on holiday (example 
from Walton. 2007). The dialogue might start out with deliberative dialogue followed by 
 
12 In addition to the four main ad-arguments there are several that might be of interest – and especially argumentum ad 
ignorantiam: 
• argumentum ad captandum, an appeal based on arousing popular passions  
• argumentum ad crumenam, an appeal based on money or the promise of profit 
• argumentum ad inconvienti, an appeal based on the hardship or inconvenience involved  
• argumentum ad verecundiam, an appeal to shame based on respect for authority  
• argumentum ad absurdum, an appeal revealing the absurdity of one’s opponent’s point of view rather 
than establishing the merits of one’s own position  
• argumentum ad ignorantiam, based on not knowing. This last ad-argument is easy to twist and manipulate so to 
place the burden of proof. A messenger might argue that a proposition is true when it is not proved to be false. The 
other way around; a proposition is false since it has not been proven to be true – there is a ghost in my house because 
it is not proven that there aren’t, (992, p. 5). And to be turned around again, there are no ghosts because no one ever 




persuasion dialogue, and maybe ends up with eristic dialogue, and a quarrel. If that is the case, 
the dialogue shift might take place as a function of the conflicting interests that come up during 
the conversation.  
The ad-arguments might be seen as functional when one of the parties in a dialogue 
applies the advantage of playing by the effects of dialogue shifts as inference used in everyday 
discourse. So, when a proponent during an inquiry lacks burden of proof, that challenge might 
be circumvented by a shift to eristic dialogue. And this might take place unnoticed when 
respondents are unaware of the maneuver. 
Maneuvering an audience by speech might for some be a complicated combination of 
real and fallacious arguments – even in a President’s state of the union address – and as such a 
mixture of dialogues, e.g. argumentative dialogue and eristic dialogue. The last type of dialogue 
appears to be like a critical discussion presenting logical reasoning and arguments both to 
blame the other party for being illogical and for trying to occupy the higher moral standard. A 
proponent might under conditions of awareness (accurately calibrating the relation between 
truth and lies in the speech) and unawareness (gullible motives combined with lack of insight 
in the matter outlined by speech-writers) intentionally or unintentionally shift from one 
dialogue type to another and circumvent evidence and truth (cf. e.g. WMD in Iraq). 
  
5. The PHA, fallacious arguments and the PSA  
A question is how the PSA with results from the lab can complement the PHA with knowledge 
found outside the lab. When the empirical research on the PSA shows that people are prone to 
fallacies as to production and evaluation of arguments (Wolfe, p. 92), it seems odd that it does 
not show interest in fallacies while aware of poor decisions.     
M&S claim that reasoning frequently leads to epistemic impairment and poor decisions. 
This suggests that the function of reasoning should be reconsidered (cf. as argumentative, social 
and adaptive). When M&S hold that humans are dependent on communication and liable to 
misinformation and disinformation and for that reason aim at distinguishing good arguments 
from bad ones and hence genuine information from misinformation (M&S p. 64, 72), this is 
far more the case outside than inside the lab. Therefore, it surprising that M&S are not so 
interested in research outside the lab, even though they admit that the socially argumentative 
mind needs to be investigated more thoroughly (M&S, 101).   
Misinformation is employed in the PSA literature. Disinformation is more closely 
connected to intentionality and that one party deceives, or misleads or propagates the other 
party. That fits into a context of the PHA. People in laboratories are doing their best when 
asked to, rather than as poorly as they can when it works, as it often does in an ordinary 
mass/communication context of the PHA outside the lab. This implies that the PHA might 
show interest in critical theory and fallacious arguments, and the PSA in positively discovering 
widely whatever comes up in a lab furnished with “WEIRD” (cf. Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich and Developed) people. Reasoning in laboratories seems still to be the 
center of attraction for the PSA. Reasoning outside laboratories is not much investigated under 
controlled conditions as to dependent variables; it requires thoughtful and elegant design. 
Instead, the PHA has a huge selection of examples and cases including weaknesses and failures 
ad argumentation and striking versions of fallacies outside the lab, as to e.g. mass-
communication.   
When narrowing the relation between the PHA and the PSA, there seem to be more 
noteworthy differences in addition to perspectives than a potential for a complementary 
perspective. The PHA seems oriented towards arguments that clarify why informal logic is 
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essential for understanding everyday argumentation and why formal logic is not a sufficient 
outlook for understanding.   
The PSA on the other hand might offer evidence without ties to a normativity based on 
formal logic, such as argumentation schemes and structures of inference. Walton (2007) 
however, claims that even Le Bon, 1896, cannot underestimate the role of logic too much. If 
logical structure is defined qua condition for common understanding between proponent and 
audience, then there will always be a logical structure in any oral presentation. Even emotional 
appeals are defined as always having argumentation schemes and a logical argumentation 
structure. Thus, responding to e.g. fear or a ferocious personal attack an audience must “be 
persuaded by orchestrating that appeal through forms of argumentation the audience can follow 
and respond to” (Walton.2007, p. 21).  
As a reference to argumentation schemes Walton makes interesting conditions for not 
giving up argumentation schemes and a certain argumentation structure as permanent premises 
for emotional appeals. Yet, Mercier is strongly critical to teaching fallacies, 2017. One of 
Mercier’s arguments is that having the ability to discover flaws in an argument by 
argumentation schemes does not imply that this knowledge will be used to overcome myside 
bias (Mercier.2017, p. 10). 
Indeed, argumentation schemes do not seem necessary for understanding how an 
audience is influenced by emotional appeals. A proponent before an audience that is upset, 
scared, or angry, hitting out for revenge against the police after another “law enforcement 
assassination” might serve as an example. Yes, the appeal from a proponent might always 
follow some type of structure, even without any plan or intention. When the proponent is 
emotionally strongly engaged and speaks the same language as the audience, respondents likely 
understand very well as is, though unaware of argumentation schemes and logical structure.  
 
6. Conclusions, implications and future research 
When concluding on how the PHA and the PSA might complement one another, it seems 
reasonable to look into elements of common ground as well as differences to meet the need for 
a broader basis for argument evaluation as represented by everyday logic. Even when members 
of a group do not have any opinion of the subject at issue, they have beliefs decisive for 
production and evaluation of arguments, effectuated by everyday logic and basic elements, 
such as motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and commitments (cf. political and religious 
commitments). These basic challenges have been expressed in many different ways and terms. 
For example, when “accuracy” and “utility” are separable “there is not always selection for 
accuracy, but instead for a psychology that fixes representations – in oneself and in others – 
along actuarially beneficial dimensions” (Pietraszewski, p. 87). This is in line with M&S’s 
claims that arguers are not after the truth, but for arguments supporting their views (M&S, 57) 
and this sounds essential to the PSA, and the PHA. Another question is how biasing effects 
come about, as of unawareness or of awareness. If by awareness, then generating arguments 
made by sophistical tactics and fancy footwork in order to circumvent critical thinking cannot 
be excluded. The PSA appears more optimistic, i.e., having trust in the other party by 
downplaying the risk of being misled (M&S, 2011b, p. 96). This optimism might be an outcome 
of collecting data in a lab and limiting in situ by in vitro.  
Without being explicit about the limitations of their empirical references and data in 
vitro, M&S find that people deliver poor performance the more standardized a reasoning task 
is (cf. e.g. drawing simple modus tollens tasks), but they regard people as good informal arguers, 
even in debates when trying to convince the other party, and better when representing others. 
As claimed in a peer commentary, a “WEIRD” selection of in globo represents less than 12% 
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of individuals (Narvaez, 2011, p. 84), without knowing if another selection and a representation 
of the universe would make any difference.  
Now, is a narrow representation of the universe evidence for M&S’s claim that in group 
achievement the confirmation bias is active in the production of arguments only, in contrast to 
evaluation of arguments? The PHA observations outside the lab give the impression that it is 
hard to draw a line between producing arguments and evaluating them. When the function of 
reasoning is social for the purposes of convincing by argumentation – arguments are searched 
for and when needed, constructed for that purpose – argument evaluation is not reasonably 
protected against contamination by social mechanisms such as confirmation bias and motivated 
reasoning (e.g. to avoid or minimize cognitive dissonance). In the lab control is easier. 
The lab seems to be a marker of the difference between the PHA and the PSA. Examples 
outside the lab show that people use informal logic so that they perform badly on rational 
standards, as long as it works, even in groups (cf. GWB as President, his advisors and group-
think on WMD). Both proponent and respondent might give psychological support, even 
though it lacks logical support. By that, reasoning and argumentation might have a devastating 
epistemic function for both evaluating and constructing arguments.  
The PHA and research outside the lab have for decades pursued questions on 
circumventing evidence with regard to reasoning and choice (cf. people are not performing as 
well as possible, rather as badly as possible if gaining support for a certain conclusion or action). 
Such findings were published in comprehensive research from the Institute for Propaganda 
Analysis (IPA) conducted between WW I and WW II. The IPA-literature is, however, mainly 
on mass-communication and normative theory.  
If reasoning outside the lab could be investigated more completely by the PHA and the 
PSA, the insight and tradition of the PHA on evaluating arguments could be complemented by 
the psychological insight of the PSA tradition. And, research outside the laboratories might 
lead to new experimentation and findings, and over time promote reconsideration of the ties 
between the PHA qua informal logic and formal logic as to argumentation schemes and logical 
argumentation structures. Combining argumentation schemes and logical structure with 
research that gives insight into what is “psychologically relevant” might fruitfully alter 
argument evaluation.   
Yet, Mercier et al.2017 claim that teaching fallacies is not the answer. A possible PHA-
response is that refashioning the concept of fallacy and squaring it into argumentation schemes 
might better identify arguments such as e.g. slippery slope argument, argument from expert 
opinion and argumentum ad hominem. And the PSA underscores the importance of dialogue 
that in the past has been ignored by the PHA to the advantage of formal logic and philosophy. 
Simply ousting argumentation schemes does not seem realistic; they are not going out on date, 
they might even strengthen their position in the argumentation literature. 
What the PHA and the PSA agree on is that training makes a difference. Kuhn and 
Wolfe found that training leads to improvement in argumentation skills, compared to a deficit 
of these skills before training (Kuhn, p. 83, Wolfe p. 93). What is interesting is that exercise 
on meta-level as to communication about discourse seemed the easiest to improve, including 
skills in critical thinking and drawing argument schemes to identify arguments and 
argumentation. M&S comment that improved argumentation skills might be crucial for 
achieving success in modern academic life (p. 98). On the other hand, they hold that you might 
be a skilled arguer without having the knowledge to recognize argument forms and depict 
argument schemes, even though mastery of argument schemes creates better essayists, and 
maybe a better debater, as well as improved success in academic life (M&S, p. 98).    
With or without argument-schemes it appears engaging to expound different ways of 
“arousing emotions” in front of an audience, and how dissimilar categories of “arousing 
emotions” and the comprehensive impact of “psychologically relevant”, might decisively 
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influence argument evaluation. One might achieve increased knowledge of how dialogical 
shifts function as sliding transference from investigation and epistemic vigilance to eristic 
dialogue (cf. non-awareness of aroused emotion and loss of interest in evidence). Hence, after 
dialogue shifts into eristic, people are disengaged as to evaluating strong, weak and fallacious 
arguments. Literature on fallacious arguments seems so far to apply terms that are more 
nuanced for the analysis of argument evaluation than the work of M&S. 
One question is if outside the PSA-laboratories there is a significant and systematic 
difference between individual reasoning and reasoning in groups regarding deliberation as well 
as eristic dialogue. Another is if group discussions provide an efficient way of holding the 
confirmation bias in check, compared to the effects of teaching critical thinking skills in order 
to overcome biases on a purely individual basis (M&S, p. 65). A third is based on Mercier, 
2017 and why he now aims at argument production rather than argument evaluation and how 
to overcome myside bias. For some authors the “confirmation bias” refers to a biased search 
for weighing of evidence, while “myside bias” refers to biases in generating arguments (cf. 
Wolfe, p.93). This distinction indicates that confirmation bias is solvable whilst linked to the 
argument evaluation, whereas the myside bias seems unsolvable when linked to argument 
production. Mercier’s answer seems simple and quixotic, namely increasing motivation to look 
for argumentation against our position, and increasing its availability (Mercier.2017). It sounds 
easy, but not convincingly. And if argumentation evaluation in groups and real debates is an 
easy and steady way of overcoming biases – a reality since the dawn of human beings, even 
though it seems lost by the old ideal of reasoning (cf. the lone philosopher searching for the 
truth) – there might be abundant time for a renaissance of professedly lost realities.  
When field experimenters or lab experimenters are not unaware of extending in situ 
with in vitro or in vivo, the outcome might be coordination of theory and data along with 
improved argument evaluation. Maybe the most promising future studies for informal logic, is 
combining the PHA and the PSA by analyzing argument production and argument evaluation 
in groups and (cf. “genuine”, “real”, “ideal”, “eristic”) debates as to dialogue shifts by not 
ignoring the importance of dialogue.  
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